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RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND PROTECTIONS
IN EUROPE
ELIZABETH F. DEFEISt
INTRODUCTION
In his remarkably perceptive book, CAN GOD AND CAESAR
COEXIST? BALANCING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW, Father Robert F. Drinan ("Fr. Drinan") is critical of the
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR") for
its lack of deference to the free exercise claims of petitioners to
the Court.1 As a partial answer, he questions whether an
international mechanism could better resolve claims of violations
of religious liberty.
The failure of the ECHR to address more sensitively
infringement of religious liberty is symptomatic of the increasing
secularization of Europe, particularly the so-called Old Europe,
best exemplified by France, Spain, and Italy. The ECHR has
found secularism to be consistent with values underpinning the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms ("ECHRFF"), in harmony with the rule of law and
respect for human rights, and may be necessary to protect a
democratic system.2
Despite strong opposition from church leaders in
traditionally Catholic countries, Italy enacted legislation
permitting abortions in 1978,3 and Spain recently enacted the
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1 ROBERT F. DRINAN, S.J., CAN GOD & CAESAR COEXIST? BALANCING RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 86-95 (2004).
2 Leyla $ahin v. Turkey [GC], 44774 Eur. Ct. H.R. 98, 114 (2005) available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp 197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=1132746FF1FE
2A468ACCBCD1763D4D8149&key=17671&sessionId=5786516&skin=hudoc-
en&attachment=true.
3 Gazz. Uff, May 22, 1978, No. 140; see also Abortion, Contraception, and
Maternity Protection, 29 INT'L DIG. OF HEALTH LEGIS. 589 (1978). The "abortion
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most far-reaching legislation in Europe legalizing gay marriage.4
Similarly, Ireland, with its strong traditional Catholic population
and a Constitution enacted "In the Name of the Most Holy
Trinity,"5 recognized divorce through a referendum in 1995,6
despite a personal plea by the immensely popular Pope John
Paul II for its defeat.7 In 1995, Ireland also liberalized its laws
on sodomy,8 and earlier had provided for abortion in limited
instances, 9 despite the efforts of the Church to the contrary.
legalization statute" provides that abortion is legal through the first 90 days of
pregnancy, the costs of which are covered by the national health care system. Passed
in 1978, a Vatican-backed referendum in 1981 failed to overturn the law. See
generally Mary E. Canoles, Comment, Italy's Family Values: Embracing the
Evolution of Family To Save the Population, 21 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 183, 185-86
(2002).
4 See Samuel Loewenberg, As Spaniards Lose Their Religion, Church Leaders
Struggle to Hold On, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2005, at 44. Legislation legalizing same-
sex marriage was passed by the Spanish Parliament (Cortes) on June 30, 2005 and
officially became legal on July 3, 2005.
5 IR. CONST., 1937, pmbl., available at http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/uploadlstatic/
256.pdf.
6 Id. Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution Act, 1995 ("provide[s] for the
dissolution of marriage in certain specified circumstances"). The Family Law
(Divorce) Act, 1996, available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/ZZA33Y1996.html,
regulates items such as the grants of decree of divorce and custody (Part II) and
income tax treatment of divorced persons (Part V).
7 Daniel Williams, Pope's Influence Fails To Match His Popularity; Many
European Catholics Are Tuning Him Out, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 1995, at A34 (Pope
John Paul II urges the Irish "to reflect on the importance for society of the
indissoluble character of the marriage bond").
8 Ireland, Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885, [48 & 49 Vict. c. 69], § 11.
Ireland's sodomy law was repealed in Norris v. Ireland, (6/1987/129/180) (Oct. 26,
1988), available at http://hrw.orglgbt/pdflnorris.pdf, following the case of Dudgeon v.
United Kingdom, 7525/76 (Oct. 22, 1981), available at http://www.worldlii.org/eu/
cases/ECHR/1981/5.html, after it was found that sodomy laws violated the right to
privacy under the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. See National Lesbian and Gay Law Association Testimony for Sodomy
Law Reform, http://www.sodomylaws.org/usa/dc/dctestimonyl6.htm (last visited
Mar. 17, 2006).
9 IR. CONST., 1937, Eighth Amendment of the Constitution Act, 1983
("[a]cknowledge[s] the right to life of the unborn, with due regard to the equal right
to life of the mother"), available at http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/upload/static/256.pdf;
Id. Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution Act, 1992 ("provide[s] that Article
40.3.3 ° (the right to life of the unborn) would not limit freedom to travel between
Ireland and another state"); Id. Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution Act,
1992 ("provide[s] that Article 40.3.3' . .. would not limit freedom to obtain or make
available information relating to services lawfully available in another state").
Theoretically, abortion is legal in Ireland if there is a risk to the life of the mother.
However, the body that holds medical licenses in Ireland considers it malpractice for
any doctor to perform an abortion.
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN EUROPE
While secularism is less apparent in some countries of
Central Europe such as Poland, the increased influence of the
church since the dissolution of the Soviet Union is often
attributed to nationalist factors. In Central and Eastern Europe,
religion was suppressed under the Soviet domination, and
restriction on all religions was a major aspect of the oppression.
The Catholic Church was central in the struggle to overturn
oppressive Soviet rule, and as the nation gained its
independence, the Church emerged as a political and moral force
in Polish society. 10 Religion and religious freedom were couched
in nationalist overtones. Thus, it has been argued in Eastern
Europe that religious freedom is more a collective issue than an
individual issue. Religion is one aspect of the ability of the
people to regain their national character.1" The western concept
of religious liberty, on the other hand, is based on the Eighteenth
Century Enlightenment model and is premised on individual
rights asserted against an oppressive government and church. It
was embodied in the slogan "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity"
with a strong emphasis on liberty of the individual.
Church-state relations in Europe range from systems with
an established Church, such as England and Greece, to systems
of government with a constitutional commitment to secularism,
such as France and Turkey. However, the formal relationship
between church and state in each of the European states does not
necessarily determine the latitude that the state will allow to
free exercise of religion claims.
As Europe becomes more secular and less deferential to
religious teachings, there is a tendency for states to devalue free
exercise claims in the interests of a secular state.1 2 The ECHR,
10 KAREL BLEI, FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF: EUROPE'S STORY 146 (Royal
Van Gorcum 2002) ("Roman Catholic leaders used to protest openly against violation
or curtailment of the Church's rights ... where [it) was considered the guardian of
the nation.") (emphasis added).
11 Karel Blei, Keynote Presentation at the World Congress of the International
Association for Religious Freedom: Religious Freedom, The Basis of All Freedom
(July 30, 2002), available at http://www.iarf.net/AboutUs/Congress2002/co_
Blei.html.
12 Similarly, in the United States, as the wall of separation between Church and
state has become more rigid, free exercise rights have collided with establishment
principles, often giving way to a more robust interpretation of the establishment
clause to the detriment of free exercise claims. See generally Thomas A. Schweitzer,
The Supreme Court Rules in Favor of Religious Club's Right To Meet on Public
School Premises: Is This "Good News" for First Amendment Rights?, 18 TOURO L.
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in reviewing claims of infringement of religious liberty under
Article 9 of the ECHRFF, has generally allowed each state a wide
margin of appreciation when issues of religion are involved.
Further, the role of national decision-making bodies are given
special importance. 13 This principle will be examined in the
context of national legislation regulating newly-formed religions
and restricting the wearing of religious garb.
In his book, Fr. Drinan has suggested that an international
forum might be utilized to examine claims of infringement of
religious liberty.14 However, while there has been a proliferation
in the last decades of international tribunals and international
mechanisms to resolve disputes, it is questionable whether such
a mechanism is the optimum method to resolve disputes
concerning religious liberty in Europe. The principle of
subsidiarity, which is counter to hierarchical decision-making, is
very much a part of the European tradition and the ECHR,
through its margin of appreciation doctrine, reflects national
cultures and values. While the Court has repeatedly asserted
that it is the ultimate arbiter of guarantees in the ECHRFF,
perhaps it is this flexibility that has made the European Court of
Human Rights the most effective Court for the protection of
human rights. 5
CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN EUROPE
The history of religious freedom in Europe is remarkably
brief. In most parts of Europe, individual freedom of worship did
not exist, at least formally, from the suppression of non-Christian
worship with the Theodosian decrees of 378 AD until the
Enlightenment of the 18th century.1 6 In Western Europe during
REV. 127 (2001).
13 Leyla $ahin v. Turkey [GC], 44774 Eur. Ct. H.R. 98, 109 (Nov. 10, 2005),
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=ll
32746FF1FE2A468ACCBCD1763D4D8149&key=17671&sessionld=5786516&skin=
hudoc-en&attachment=true; see infra notes 183-88 and accompanying text
(discussion of margin of appreciation doctrine).
14 See DRINAN, supra note 1, at 5-6, 36-37, 41-43, 47.
15 See generally Mark W. Janis, The Efficacy of Strasbourg Law, 15 CONN. J.
INT'L L. 39 (2000).
16 See Wilhelm Pauck, The Christian Faith and Religious Tolerance, 15 CHURCH
HIST. 220, 220-24 (1946). Some scholars argue that a semblance of respect for the
freedom of religion and conscience in Europe dates back at least to the thirteenth
century. See Lance S. Lehnhof, Freedom of Religious Association: The Right of
Religious Organizations To Obtain Legal Entity Status Under the European
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most of the Middle Ages, Roman Catholicism was the official
religion and was practiced by the rulers and almost all of their
subjects. Other religious practices were deemed heresy. During
this period, the infamous crusades were launched and Jews
particularly suffered from various restrictions and repeated
repression. 17
Following the Reformation, Wars of Religion erupted in
many European countries between Catholic and Protestant
factions. In most feudal countries, the religion of the ruler was
the official religion under the principle of cuius regio eius
religio.18 The Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 put an end to the
Wars of Religion while providing for guarantees of religious
freedom for religious minorities. 19 However, it reinforced the
notion that each state would have an established religion,
namely that of the sovereign.
In 1789, the French Revolution brought about a dramatic
change in the perception of religious freedom and separation of
church and state was viewed as a necessary component of
democracy and liberty. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and
of the Citizen20 was greatly influenced by developments in the
United States and by the principles embodied in the Declaration
of Independence. 21 However, religious tolerance and pluralism
Convention, 2002 BYU L. REV. 561, 581 n.84 (2002) (citing T. Jeremy Gunn,
Adjudicating Rights of Conscience Under the European Convention on Human
Rights, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 306-07 (Johan D. van der Vyver & John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996)).
17 See generally EDWARD H. FLANNERY, THE ANGUISH OF THE JEWS (1965) for a
discussion of anti-Semitism in the Greek and Roman Empires and the development
of certain policies of tolerance. Flannery asserts that religious tensions date back to
the early years of the Roman Empire as the Jews and the Christians, each in turn,
struggled to gain recognition as religio licita. Before the Christian era began,
Judaism was recognized as the only "religio licita in the empire save the imperial
cult itself." Id. at 16-17.
18 See Edward J. Eberle, Roger Williams on Liberty of Conscience, 10 RODGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 289, 308 (2005).
19 See id. A notable exception is King Henry 1V of France: He demonstrated his
religious tolerance by converting from Protestantism to Catholicism, see JACOB
BURCKHARDT, JUDGMENTS ON HISTORY AND HISTORIANS 152-53 (Harry Zohn trans.,
1999), and guaranteed limited freedom for Protestants by signing the Edict of
Nantes in 1598 (later repealed by his grandson Louis XIV), see Laura Barnett,
Global Governance and the Evolution of the International Refugee Regime, 14 INT'L
J. REFUGEE L. 238, 239 (2002).
20 Available at http://www.justice.gouv.fr/anglais/europe/addhc.htm.
21 Nine of the original thirteen colonies maintained government-sponsored
churches and state-established religions. LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT
2006]
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did not make great gains in Western Europe until after World
War II, and in Eastern Europe not until after the demise of the
Soviet Union.22
The United States, on the other hand, comprised of persons
coming from diverse religious traditions, and in some instances
fleeing religious persecution, rejected the concept of established
religion and instead provided in its Constitution: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof[.]" 23  It is therefore ironic
that Europe is becoming more secular in its approach while the
United States is embracing faith-based initiatives and a closer
cooperation between church and state.24
Recent polls indicate that just under 21% of Europeans
believe that religion plays a "very important role" in their lives,
compared to 60% of Americans. 25 Unlike the United States with
its Washington prayer breakfasts and various other religious
ceremonies in public life, most countries in Europe prefer to keep
religious rituals outside of the rituals of government.
The debate over whether a reference to God or Christianity
should be included in the recent draft of the Constitution for the
European Union 26 sparked a debate on both sides of the Atlantic.
CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1-11 (2d ed. 1994).
22 Peter Juviler, Freedom and Religious Tolerance in Europe, 24 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 855, 859 (2003) (reviewing PROTECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS
MINORITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE (Peter G. Danchin & Elizabeth A. Cole eds., 2002)).
23 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Constitution also bans religious tests for public
office. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
24 See Thomas Bray, The Pope vs. Dictatorship of Relativism, N.Y. SUN, Apr. 27,
2005, at 9.
Catholicism may be paying a price for having been the officially established
church in many European countries. Thinking it had a monopoly on
religion, it grew fat, careless and corrupt, leading to a severe reaction
against all religion - unlike in the United States, where religion has mostly
been a private matter and intense competition among churches is the rule.
Id. The White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, created by
Executive Order 13199 and enacted on January 29, 2001, is charged with
strengthening the partnership between the Federal government and faith-based and
community groups. President George W. Bush also created Centers for Faith-Based
and Community Initiatives in ten cabinet departments in subsequent executive
orders.
25 Loek Halman, The European Values Study: A Third Wave, at 12 (EVS WORC
Tilburg University 2001), available at http://spitswww.uvt.nl/web/fsw/evs/documents
/EVSSourceBook.pdf; PewResearchCenter, Pew Global Attitudes Project, http:H/pew
global.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=167.
26 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C
310) [hereinafter "EU Const. Treaty"], available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/
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At the end of his term as President of the Commission of the
European Union in 1994, Jacques Delors called on churches in
Europe to discuss the question of what is Europe's "Heart and
Soul."27 In contrast, the preamble to the draft of the Constitution
as originally proposed by Valery Giscard d'Estaing, the principle
draftsperson of the draft Constitution, "specified that Europe's
inheritance was 'nourished first by the civilizations of Greece and
Rome, characterised by spiritual impulse always present in its
heritage and later by the philosophical currents of the
Enlightenment.' "28 He stated that the constitution is intended to
numerate the values adhered to by all the component parts of the
European Union. 29
Because of the objections raised by the Vatican and
numerous politicians and intellectuals, 30 the key sentence of the
preamble was revised and now acknowledges that inspiration is
drawn from "the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of
Europe" and defines Europe as a "continent open to culture,
learning and social progress[.] '"31
On the one hand, there is support from the mostly Catholic
countries, including Ireland, Italy, and Poland, for a more specific
recognition of Europe's religious roots. These states support a
Christian or Judeo-Christian reference in the preamble. On the
other hand, there is a conviction, held most tenaciously by
France and Belgium, that church and state must be totally
separate. Quite simply, religion does not belong in the
fundamental governing document of the relations of European
countries.32
lexIJOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:310:SOM:EN:HTML. Although many refer to the text
as either a constitution or a draft constitution, it is technically more accurate to
describe it as a constitutional treaty.
27 More Heart and Soul Needed in European Integration, Says Delors, EUR.
REP., No. 1987, Oct. 26, 1994; see also Blei, supra note 11.
28 John Coughlan, God and Caesar in the New Europe, AMERICA: THE NAT'L
CATH. WKLY., Aug. 4, 2003, http://www.americamagazine.org/gettext.cfm?article
TypeID=l&textID=3085&issueID=446.
29 Elizabeth F. Defeis, A Constitution for the European Union? A Transatlantic
Perspective, 19 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 351, 380 n.241 (2005).
30 Coughlan, supra note 28.
31 EU Const. Treaty, supra note 26, at pmbl.
32 Defeis, supra note 29, at 381; Richard Bernstein, Letter from Europe:
Continent Wrings Its Hands Over Proclaiming Its Faith, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2003,
at A4; Kenneth L. Woodward, An Oxymoron: Europe Without Christianity, N.Y.
TIMES, June 14, 2003, at A15.
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The Preamble of the Constitution of the United States is
much simpler and straightforward. The drafters were
determined that religious differences not impede the adoption of
a new Constitution and thus, God is not mentioned in the
preamble or the Constitution itself. The Preamble starts with
the statement "We the People[,]" thus affirming sovereignty in
the people and sets forth the purposes of the Constitution: "to
form a more perfect Union, establish [j]ustice, insure domestic
[tlranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the
general [w]elfare, and secure the [b]lessings of [1]iberty[.]J 3 3 The
religion clauses of the First Amendment prohibit the
establishment of religion and guarantee free exercise. They are
augmented by the provision prohibiting religious tests for public
offices. 34
Pope Benedict XVI's disappointment with the failure to
mention Christian roots in the preamble to the EU Constitution
is discussed in The Europe of Benedict in the Crisis of Cultures.35
Pope Benedict states, "Europe has developed a culture which
excludes God from the public conscience in a way never before
known to humanity[.]" 36 He argues, "Europe is trying to build its
future on an ideal of freedom which contains many contradictions
and which pushes religion into the private sphere, where it has
no relevance." 37
The interaction between the churches and the European
Union is set forth in the draft Constitution as follows:
(1) The Union respects and does not prejudice the status under
national law of churches and religious associations or
communities in the Member States.
(2) The Union equally respects the status under national law of
philosophical and non-confessional organisations.
(3) Recognising their identity and their specific contribution, the
33 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
34 Id. amend. I; see supra note 23. "[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as
a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States." U.S. CONST.
art. VI, cl. 3.
35 Pope Says Europe Is Getting Confused About Freedom, ANSA English Media
Service, Rome, Italy, June 22, 2005 (citing POPE BENEDICT XVI, THE EUROPE OF
BENEDICT IN THE CRISIS OF CULTURES (Editrice Vaticana 2005)).
36 Id.
37 Id.
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Union shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue
with these churches and organisations. 38
While the first two paragraphs restate a declaration
attached to the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, 39 the third is an
innovation that recognizes the important contribution of
churches and encourages dialogue between the European Union
and churches.
The delicate relationship between both well-established
churches, such as the Roman Catholic Church, and emerging
religious movements, such as sects and minority belief systems,
and the state usually falls into one of three categories 40 :
A) national church systems (e.g. England, Denmark, Greece);
B) concordatarian 4' or systems of separation and cooperation (e.g.
Germany, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Poland, Portugal); or
C) separate or secular (e.g. France, the Netherlands, Ireland).
However, the formal relationship does not necessarily determine
the degree of deference that the state accords to religious
practices.
A. Established Religion and Church/State Relations
An established church or state religion is a religious body or
creed officially endorsed by the state. The support of an
established church varies from mere endorsement or financial
support with freedom for others to practice, to the prohibition on
other church operations and persecution of adherents of other
churches. In Europe, Catholic and Protestant denominations
vied for state sponsorship, and in the sixteenth century, the
principle of cuius regio eius religio was included in the treaty
that marked the Peace of Augsburg in 1555.42 Thus, the religion
38 EU Const. Treaty, supra note 26, at 36 (Art. 1-52).
39 Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Related Acts, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J.
(C 340) 3 [hereinafter Amsterdam Treaty], available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/lex/en/treaties/dat/11997D/htm11997D.html.
40 Silvio Ferrari, The Emerging Pattern of Church and State in Western Europe:
The Italian Model, 1995 BYU L. REV. 421, 421 (1995); see also Alenka Kuhelj,
Religious Freedom in European Democracies, 20 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 1, 15-16
(2005).
41 Ferrari, supra note 40, at 421 n.1. Concordats are formal agreements between
church and state. Many scholars agree that concordats afford stronger protection to
churches than state laws as they are given the same weight of authority as
international treaties.
42 See Gerhard Robbers, The Permissible Scope of Legal Limitations on the
2006]
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of the sovereign was deemed the religion of the state although a
degree of religious liberty was allowed for other religions.
Today, most European countries have disestablished the
state Church. For example, the Roman Catholic Church was
disestablished in Austria in 1918, in Spain in 1978, and in Italy
in 1984. 43  Ireland disestablished the Church of Ireland
(Anglican) in 1871. 44 With the fall of the communist regime,
countries in Central and Eastern Europe have redefined the
relationship between Church and state, and not a single state
has adopted the established Church model.45
In Europe, the established church can be illustrated by the
Church of England which is the official Christian church in
England. It also acts as the senior branch of the worldwide
Anglican community. Although the British Monarch has the title
of "Supreme Governor" of the Church of England, in practice,
effective leadership is vested in the Archbishop of Canterbury. 46
The Church of England does not receive any direct government
support but relies on donations and on the income from its
various public endorsements. However, the government does
provide some support, such as tax relief for renovations of
religious buildings. Religious groups need not register with the
government, but, since the advancement of religion is considered
to be a charitable function, they are classified as charities and as
such enjoy a wide range of tax benefits. State funding is
provided for approximately 7,000 so-called "faith schools" which
are, for the most part, Anglican, Catholic, or Methodist schools,
although the government has also funded Muslim, Sikh, Greek
Orthodox, and Seventh Day Adventist schools. 47
Freedom of Religion or Belief in Germany, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 841, 868-69
(2005).
43 Reference.com, State Religion, http://www.reference.comlbrowse/wikilstate-
religion (last visited November 5, 2006).
44 Id.
45 Silvio Ferrari, Conclusion, Church and State in Post-Communist Europe, in
LAW AND RELIGION IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE 414 (Silvio Ferrari, W. Cole
Durham, Jr. eds., Peeters 2003).
46 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2005: UNITED KINGDOM (Nov. 8,
2005), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51589.htm [hereinafter
STATE DEP'T, U.K. REPORT]; see James W. Torke, The English Religious
Establishment, 12 J.L. & RELIGION 399, 411-12, 416-17, 421, 435 n.174 (1995-
1996).
47 STATE DEP'T, U.K. REPORT, supra note 46. Religious education in publicly
maintained schools is mandated and syllabi are required to reflect the predominant
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In the public service, the British government seeks to
accommodate religious practices. For example, the Prison
Service permits Muslim employees to take time off during their
shifts to pray.48 However, new sects, such as the Church of
Scientology, "[do] not come within the charity law definition of a
religion[,]" and thus the Prison Service does not facilitate prison
visits by their ministers.49 However, prisoners may practice their
religion consistent with good order and discipline.5 0
While the fact that the Church of England is an established
church appears to have little or no effect in terms of infringement
on the exercise of other religions, Greece, which recognizes the
Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ as the state religion, has
encountered difficulties, particularly with respect to its ban on
proselytizing51 and its regulation of places of worship. 52 Legal
and administrative burdens are placed on non-Orthodox religious
organizations. For example, in order to establish a "house of
prayer" for religions other than the Orthodox Church, Judaism,
or Islam, the Civil Code's provisions pertaining to corporations
must be complied with.53
In Greece, as in the United States, the parameters of
religious freedom are often developed in the context of the
activities of Jehovah's Witnesses. 54 In Kokkinakis v. Greece,55
Kokkinakis was convicted of proselytism because he went to the
home of the wife of the local Greek Orthodox Center cantor and
place of Christianity. However, the teachings and practices of other principle
religions in the country must be taken in account and the syllabi must be non-
denominational and must not attempt to convert students.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 1975 Syntagma [SYN] [Constitution] art. 13(2) (Greece); see Kokkinakis v.
Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 11 (1993); BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN
RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
REPORT 2005: GREECE (Nov. 8, 2005), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf2005/
51555.htm [hereinafter STATE DEP'T, GREECE REPORT]; see also Adam M. Smith, The
Perplexities of Promoting Religious Freedom Through International Law: A Review of
Robert Drinan's Can God and Caesar Coexist?, 30 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 733,
754 (2005) (book review) (demonstrating that "[miore than employing a narrow
interpretation of religious freedom, the ECHR has, at times, been inordinately
hostile to religious dissenters claiming violations of their rights").
52 STATE DEP'T, GREECE REPORT, supra note 51.
53 Id.
54 See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
55 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 7 (1993).
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told her about the Jehovah's Witnesses. There was no evidence
that she was particularly vulnerable or that her religious views
were affected in any way. Greek law defines proselytizing as:
in particular, any direct or indirect attempt to intrude on the
religious beliefs of a person of a different religious persuasion
(eterodoxos), with the aim of undermining those beliefs, either
by any kind of inducement or promise of an inducement or
moral support or material assistance, or by fraudulent means or
by taking advantage of his inexperience, trust, need, low
intellect or nalvety. 56
The ECHR held that although there was a right to
proselytize, the state could prohibit "improper proselytism" since
its aim was the "protection of the rights and freedoms of
others."57  The Court held that there was a right to try to
convince others of one's religious beliefs because otherwise the
freedom to change one's religion "would be likely to remain a
dead letter."58 The Court acknowledged the existence of a margin
of appreciation under European supervision and held that the
aim of the Greek legislation in seeking to prohibit "improper
proselytism" was a proper purpose because its aim was the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 59 However, the
means adopted by Greece were not necessary in a democratic
society.
B. Cooperative Church-State Relations
Cooperation between Church and state in Europe is
sometimes expressed through a Concordat or agreement between
the civil authorities and a religious organization. The best
known and most widely-discussed is the Concordat agreed to by
the Catholic Church and the Italian government.
Prior to the adoption of the Italian Constitution in 1947,
relations with the Catholic Church in Italy were governed by the
Lateran Treaty or Concordat of 1929, which recognized
Catholicism as the state religion and the independence of Vatican
56 Id. at 16 (citing Greek Law 1672/1939).
57 Id. at 44, 48.
58 Id. at 31.
59 Id. at 47-50; see also Natan Lerner, How Wide the Margin of Appreciation?
The Turkish Headscarf Case, the Strasbourg Court, and Secularist Tolerance, 13
WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DISPUTE RES. 65, 81-82 (2005).
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City. 60 In 1984, the Concordat was amended and, although it
formalized the principle of a secular state, it nonetheless
accorded the Roman Catholic Church certain privileges. 61 For
example, Catholic teachers, paid by the state, are selected by the
Church to provide instruction in "hour of religion" classes taught
in the public schools. 62 An "intesa" or accord can also be entered
into by non-Catholic confessions which grant certain privileges,
such as funding through taxpayers check offs and providing
"ministers of religion" with "automatic access to state hospitals,
prisons, and military barracks."63 Such intese were entered into
between the State and the Waldesian Church (1984), Adventists
and Assembly of God (1988), Jews (1989), and Baptists and
Lutherans (1995).64
60 Lateran Treaty, Italy-Vatican, Feb. 11, 1929, O.V.T.S. 161, Eur. T.S. No.
590019.
61 See Gazz. Uff., Supplemento Ordinario, No. 85, Apr. 10, 1985; Acta
Apostolicae Sedis, Vol. LXXVII, No. 6, (June 3, 1985), Art. 9; Agreement to Amend
the 1929 Lateran Concordat, Italy-The Holy See, art. 9, Feb. 18, 1984, 24 I.L.M.
1589, 1589-97 (1985). The agreement between the Italian Republic and the Holy See
to amend the 1929 Lateran Concordat, signed on Feb. 18, 1984, was ratified on June
3, 1985 and approved by the Italian Parliament into law (no. 121) on March 25,
1985. Id. at 1589; see generally BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR,
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2005: ITALY
(Nov. 8, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irfI2005/51560.htm
[hereinafter STATE DEP'T, ITALY REPORT].
62 STATE DEP'T, ITALY REPORT. The Agreement further states:
In relation to Article 9:
(a) The teaching of Catholic religion in the schools indicated at Paragraph
(2) shall be given-in conformity with the doctrine of the Church and with
respect for the freedom of conscience of the pupils-by the teachers who are
recognized by the ecclesiastical authority as being qualified thereto and
who are appointed, in agreement therewith, by the school authority.
In infant and elementary schools, this teaching may be given by the class
teacher, if recognized by the ecclesiastical authority as being qualified
thereto and if willing to do it.
(b) By means of a subsequent understanding between the competent school
authorities and the Italian Bishops Conference, it shall be determined:
(1) the teaching prospectus of Catholic religion in public schools of
every order and grade;
(2) the organization of this teaching, also with respect to its position in
the school time table;
(3) the criteria for selecting the textbooks;
(4) the requirements of professional qualification for the teachers.
Agreement to Amend the 1929 Lateran Concordat, supra note 61, at 1597.
63 See STATE DEP'T, ITALY REPORT, supra note 61; see also Law No. 1159 [on
Non-Catholic Religions Permitted Within the State] and Implementation Decree No.
289, June 24, 1929, available at http://www.religlaw.org/template.php?id=82.
64 STATE DEP'T, ITALY REPORT, supra note 61.
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Since the fall of Communism, other countries, such as
Poland, have chosen the bi-lateral route to govern relations
between church and state. Relations between the Catholic
Church and Poland are regulated by the Concordat of 1993,
signed by the Holy See and Poland and ratified in 1998.65 The
government and the Catholic Church meet regularly to discuss
Church-state relations.66 While the Constitution provides for
"freedom of conscience and religion.., to everyone,"67 the
Catholic Church has continued to play a major role in Polish
society and politics, and in many respects Polish national
identity derives from Catholicism. Indeed, in line with Catholic
teachings and despite the pro-choice stance of the EU, Poland
has passed one of the most restrictive abortion laws in the
European Union.68
C. The Secular State and Church/State Relations
The separate or secular state is exemplified by France. After
a turbulent history of religious oppression, France defined itself
as a secular state in the French Law of 1905.69 The Law
provides: "The Republic ensures the liberty of conscience. It
guarantees the free exercise of religion, under restrictions
prescribed by the interest in public order [and] ... does not
recognize, remunerate, or subsidize any religious
denomination." 70
"LaYcit6," a uniquely French principle, is difficult to define
but generally summarizes the prevailing beliefs regarding the
proper relationship between the French state and religion.7 1 One
65 Concordat, Pol-The Holy See, July 28, 1993, signed by Mr. K. Skubiszewski,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland and the Reverend J.
Kowalczyk, the Apostolic Nuncio, in Warsaw.
66 Krystyna Daniel, The Church-State Situation in Poland After the Collapse of
Communism, 1995 BYU L. REV. 401, 409-10 (1995).
67 CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND art. 53, sec. 1, available at
http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/konse.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2006).
68 See Alicia Czerwinski, Sex, Politics, and Religion: The Clash Between Poland
and the European Union over Abortion, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 653, 660 (2004).
69 Law on the Separation of Churches and the State of Dec. 9, 1905, Journal
Officiel de la R6publique Frangaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Dec. 11, 1905,
p. 7205. For the current version of the 1905 law, as amended, see http://www.
legifrance.gouv.fr/texteconsolide/MCEBW.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2006).
70 Jacques Robert, Religious Liberty and French Secularism, 2003 BYU L. REV.
637, 640 (2003) (citation omitted).
71 T. Jeremy Gunn, Religious Freedom and Laicit& A Comparison of the United
States and France, 2004 BYU L. REV. 419, 420 (2004).
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scholar has explained the term as affirming that: "(1) religion is
fundamentally incompatible with the institutions of the secular
French Republic, (2) religion potentially undermines one's loyalty
to the state, and (3) the public manifestation of one's beliefs
should be confined to the private and not the public sphere."72 It
rests on three related values: "liberty of conscience, equality of
rights in spiritual and religious choices, and neutrality of
political power."73  The lalcit6 status has been hailed by
President Jacques Chirac as the "cornerstone of the Republic, the
bundle of our common values of respect, tolerance, and dialogue,
to which I call all of the French to rally."74  Ironically, this
affirmation of lafcit6 was made in a speech calling for a law that
would prohibit children from wearing conspicuous religious
clothing in public schools.
This commitment to secularism, however, does not require
that all support for religion be abolished. For example, religious
ministers may be paid by the state when they render services to
the general public.75
However, in some states which profess a complete separation
between church and state, a dominant Church continues to
exercise much political influence. Despite Ireland's professed
system of separation, the church exerts a much stronger
influence than in Denmark, which maintains a national church
system, 76 and indeed religion continues to permeate judicial and
political discussion.
The Irish Constitution was adopted in 1937 and originally
contained what is known as the "special position" clause, which
72 Peter Cumper, Book Review: Regulating Religion-Case Studies from Around
the Globe, 13 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DISPUTE RESOL. 87, 104 (2005) (reviewing
REGULATING RELIGION: CASE STUDIES FROM AROUND THE GLOBE (James T.
Richardson ed., 2004)).
73 Gunn, supra note 71, at 466.
74 Id. at 428. For an excellent discussion of laicit6 in France, see T. Jeremy
Gunn, Under God but Not the Scarf.- The Founding Myths of Religious Freedom in
the United States and Laicit6 in France, 46 J. CHURCH & ST. 7 (2004). See also
REGULATING RELIGION: CASE STUDIES FROM AROUND THE GLOBE 27-28 (James T.
Richardson ed., 2004).
75 Jacques Robert, Religious Liberty and French Secularism, 2003 BYU L. REV.
637, 641 (2003).
76 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2005: DENMARK (Nov. 8, 2005),
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51549.htm ("The Constitution
stipulates that the Evangelical Lutheran Church is the national church, the reigning
monarch shall be a member [of] the church, and the state shall support it.").
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recognized the special position of the Roman Catholic Church as
the faith professed by a majority of Irish citizens. It also
recognized and listed other religious denominations including the
Church of Ireland, the Presbyterian Church, and the Jewish
Congregation that were in existence at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution. In 1972, through constitutional amendment,
those provisions were eliminated.7 7 However, the Constitution
provides: "The State acknowledges that the homage of public
worship is due to Almighty God. It shall hold His Name in
reverence, and shall respect and honour religion. s78  It also
provides that "[f]reedom of conscience and the free profession and
practice of religion are, subject to public order and morality,
guaranteed to every citizen. ' 79 Further, the State "guarantees
not to endow any religion"80 and "shall not impose any
disabilities or make any discrimination on the ground of religious
profession, belief or status."8'
Under these provisions, while the state cannot establish a
state religion or prefer one religion over another, it can provide
financial assistance to denominational schools and can carve out
an exception from a rule of general application to accommodate
free exercise claims. Indeed, it did so as early as 1972 through
legislation permitting kosher butcher shops to remain open while
other shops were required to close.82
The influence of the church in Irish society and political life
is undisputed, and the Republic of Ireland is historically and
culturally a Catholic nation. All of the debates on abortion,
divorce, and gay rights were accompanied by Church
pronouncements and acknowledged Church involvement.8 3
77 IR. CONST., 1937, Fifth Amendment of the Constitution Act, 1972, available
at http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/upload/static/256.pdf ("Remove[s] from the
Constitution the special position of the Catholic Church and the recognition of other
named religious denominations.").
78 Id. art. 44.1.
79 Id. art. 44.2.1'.
80 Id. art. 44.2.2.
81 Id. art. 44.2.3.
82 Kathryn A. O'Brien, Comment, Ireland's Secular Revolution: The Waning
Influence of the Catholic Church and the Future of Ireland's Blasphemy Law, 18
CONN. J. INT'L L. 395, 405 (2002).
83 Id. at 406-07, 412, 417-18.
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN EUROPE
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN PRACTICE IN EUROPE
Whether or not any of these models are more or less
favorable to religious freedom will be examined in two contexts:
the regulation of cults or sects and the prohibition on public
displays of religious symbols and dress codes.
A. Regulation of New Religious Movements
New religious movements have become a focus of regulation
and legislation in several countries in Western Europe and, as
Fr. Drinan points out, have been subjected to restrictions.8 4
Under the United States model, the government does not enact
legislation to protect individuals from undue pressure or coercion
by religious groups. Rather, unacceptable or dangerous behavior
is handled under the state penal codes or the civil laws.8 5 In
Europe, on the other hand, several states have enacted
legislation to "protect" its citizens from the activities of cults or
sects, and curb activities that the state deems potentially
harmful.
France, arguably the most secular state in Europe, has
enacted the most draconian regulation of new religion.8 6 The
Anti-Cult Movement in France is dominated by two associations:
UNADFI, the National Union of Associations for the Protection of
the Family and the Individual, and the CCMM, the Center
Against Mental Manipulation.87 While both organizations began
as voluntary organizations, they now work closely with State
agencies and receive State subsidies.88
In 1996, a parliamentary commission issued a report on so-
called cults and identified 172 groups as cults, including the
Jehovah's Witnesses, the Church of Scientology, and the
Theological Institute of Neims (an evangelical Christian Bible
college).8 9  Following the report, a Cult Observatory was
established, and in 1998, the Inter-Ministerial Mission to
Combat Cults ("MILS") was established to assist public
84 DRINAN, supra note 1, at 157-58.
85 REGULATING RELIGION, supra note 74, at 2-3.
86 See James A. Beckford, 'Latcitg,' 'Dystopia,'and the Reaction to New Religious
Movements in France, in REGULATING RELIGION, supra note 74, at 31; see also
Jacques Robert, supra note 75, at 652-55.
87 Beckford, supra note 86, at 31.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 30; DRINAN, supra note 1, at 157-58.
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authorities to deal with cults.90 Finally, in 2001, the French
Parliament enacted the About-Picard Law that, among other
provisions, provided for the dissolution of religious groups for
various reasons, including endangering the life or the physical or
psychological well-being of a person, placing minors at mortal
risk, violating another person's freedom, dignity, or identity,
practicing illegal medicine or pharmacology, false advertising,
and fraud and falsification. 91 The Anti-Cult Movement in France
enjoys wide public support 92 and is attributable at least in part to
the lacit6 underpinnings of the French State, which requires the
exclusion of religion from state institutions and the substitution
of principles of rationality and morality. Since cults are by
definition anti-national they are viewed as a danger to the state.
Thus, the French government has been most aggressive in
warning and protecting its citizens from cults and in enacting
laws and regulations to impede their growth.
Borrowing on the French experience, other European nations
have initiated commissions or regulations affecting cults. In
Germany, a cooperation State, the "Sects and Psychogroups"
Commission has issued a report pertaining to cults, which
recommended direct public funding of private counseling and
information centers to counter the influence of cults. It also
recommended that a new office be established to monitor "new
90 Beckford, supra note 86, at 30.
91 Law No. 2001-504 of June 12, 2001, Journal Officiel de la R6publique
Franqaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], June 13, 2001, p. 9337, available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspadfUnTexteDeJorfnumjo=JUSX9903887L.
Named after French parliament members Nicolas About and Catherine Picard, the
About-Picard Law includes the following descriptive text: "tendant el renforcer la
prgvention et la repression des mouvements sectaires portant atteinte aux droits de
l'homme et aux libertgs fondamentales" ("intended to reinforce the prevention and
repression of sectarian [cultic] movements that infringe on human rights and
fundamental freedoms"). Id. (emphasis added).
92 But see Senator Gordon H. Smith, Religious Freedom and the Challenge of
Terrorism, 2002 BYU L. REV. 205, 208-09 (2002).
This new law was passed by the French Senate on May 30, 2001, and
creates a vague crime, originally called 'mental manipulation.' The law
criminalizes teachings that may result in acts of 'psychological
dependency'-even if these actions are freely chosen-if others might view
the teachings as harmful to the believer. This legislation was widely
criticized by leading Catholic and Protestant leaders in France, by leading
figures within the Council of Europe, and by countless human rights
organizations.
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religious and ideological communities and psychogroups. 93
Finally, in September 2001, the Associations Act, which permits
the government to ban organizations with criminal objectives or
activities against the constitutional order or international
understanding, was amended to apply to religious associations
that previously had been exempted from the law. 94  Not
surprisingly, the first religious organization to be targeted was
an Islamic community charged with promoting hatred against
the Jews and Israel. However, in the Parliamentary debates
concerning the amendment, the Church of Scientology was
mentioned as a possible target.
Belgium, another secular state, has also moved to restrict
the activities of cults.95  Italy, a state with a Concordat
agreement, 96 and the Netherlands, a secular state, both exhibit a
much more tolerant view of cults. 97 Poland seems to follow the
French model of regulating sects, although its law is much more
tolerant than the French model. 98
The ECHR has interpreted Article 9 of the ECHRFF, which
pertains to religious freedom, to protect Druidism, 99 pacifism, 100
veganism,101  Islamism, 02  the Krishna Consciousness
93 Final Report of the Enquete Commission on "So-called Sects and
Psychogroups": New Religious and Ideological Communities and Psychogroups in
the Federal Republic of Germany (Wolfgang Fehlberg and Monic Ulloa-Fehlberg,
trans. 1998), available at http://www.csj.org/infoserv-articles/german-enquete_
commissionreport.htm.
94 See Verena Zoller, Liberty Dies by Inches: German Counter-Terrorism
Measures and Human Rights, 5 GERMAN L.J. 469, 488-90, available at
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/VolO5NoO5/PDFVol05 No 05_469-494_spec
ialissueZoeller.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2006).
95 REGULATING RELIGION, supra note 74, at 24; see also BUREAU OF
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2005: BELGIUM (Nov. 8, 2005), http://www.
state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51543.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2006) ("[T]he
Government continued to observe and research groups that a parliamentary
commission's unofficial report labeled 'harmful sects.' ").
96 See Michael W. Homer, New Religions in the Republic of Italy, in
REGULATING RELIGION, supra note 74, at 203.
97 Richard Singelenberg, Foredoomed To Failure: The Anti-Cult Movement in
the Netherlands, in REGULATING RELIGION, supra note 74, at 213.
98 Agnieszka Kociafska, Anti-Cult Movements and Governmental Reports on
"Sects and Cults" The Case of Poland, in REGULATING RELIGION, supra note 74, at
267.
99 A.R.M. Chappell v. United Kingdom (1987, App 12587/86) 53 DR 241.
100 Arrowsmith v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7050/75, 19 Eur. Comm'n H.R.
Dec. & Rep. 5, 6-7, 19-20 (1978) (pacifist protest).
101 X v. United Kingdom, 3 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 62 (1975) (right of
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movement, 10 3  Jehovah's Witnesses, 10 4  the Divine Light
Zentrum, 10 5 and the Church of Scientology10 6. With respect to the
Church of Scientology, the Commission has upheld a ban on the
Church of Scientology advertising an "E-Meter" on the basis that
the scientific claims were misleading. 10 7 The Commission ruled
that the state was regulating the commercial and not religious
activities of the Church108 and accepted the fact that the Church
fell under the protection of Article 9 of the Convention pertaining
to religious freedom with little discussion.
B. Regulation of Dress Codes and Religious Symbols
Dress codes, which in effect ban the wearing of Islamic
headscarves, have been the focus of attention throughout Europe,
and legislation regulating dress with religious significance has
been enacted in several states. Although challenged as violating
the free exercise of religion guaranteed in the European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the
Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, in an
expansive ruling, has upheld the right of a state to ban the
wearing of the headscarf in universities.
The issue of whether Muslim girls could wear their scarves
in the classroom first surfaced in France in 1989 when Lionel
Jospin, the Education Minister, asked the Conseil d'Etat court to
render a judgment on the matter. 10 9 The Conseil ruled that
free expression does not include right to incite others to desert army, to murder
officers, and to supply weapons to the enemy).
102 Ahmad v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 126, 127, 132-33 (1981).
103 ISKCON v. United Kingdom, 76-A D.R. 90, 92, 105-08 (1994).
104 Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993).
105 Omkarananda v. Switzerland, 25 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 105, 106,
117 (1981) (imprisonment of leader of religious group which he led in acts of criminal
violence).
106 X & Church of Scientology v. Sweden, 16 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 68,
70 (1979); Keir Starmer, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT
OF 1998 AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 131 (1999).
107 X& Church of Scientology, 16 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. Rep. at 71-72.
108 Id. at 72.
109 Elisa T. Beller, The Headscarf Affair: The Conseil d'Etat on the Role of
Religion and Culture in French Society, 39 TEX. INT'L L.J. 581, 583-84 (2004).
The Conseil d'Etat is one of three high courts in France, the other two
being the Cour de Cassation, the final venue for appeals of cases involving
two private parties, and the Conseil Constitutionnel, the tribunal that
decides the constitutionality of laws under consideration by the parliament.
Together, these three courts serve the roles that in the United States are
performed by the Supreme Court, as well as some additional functions.
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wearing ostentatious religious garb that "constitute[d] an act of
intimidation, provocation, proselytising, or propaganda;
threaten[ed] the dignity and freedom of students or other
members of the educational community[;] or disrupt[ed] the
school's normal functioning" was prohibited. 110
When the issue came before the Conseil in March 1995, the
Conseil upheld a school regulation that banned headscarves
during classes in physical education as not unduly restrictive.
The Conseil held that the regulation did not have the effect of
outlawing headscarves as the students and their parents
claimed. However, the students' refusal to remove their scarves
constituted an interference with the normal functioning of their
education and was a disruptive violation of the school's order.11
Consequently, the girls' expulsion was upheld. 112
In the wake of this controversy, President Jacques Chirac
appointed a commission, the Stasi Commission, to examine the
issue of laicit6. In 2003, the commission issued its report and
recommended that wearing a headscarf in public schools be
prohibited. The ban, as drafted in the Stasi Report, states in
part:
In respect for freedom of conscience, and the pure character of
the institutions, behaviours and signs expressing a religious or
political affiliation are prohibited in schools and colleges. Any
appropriate sanction is to be taken after the pupil is invited to
conform to his obligations. The prohibited behaviours and
religious signs are open signs, such as large crosses, veils, or
Id. at 602. "In its judicial function, the Conseil d'ttat's word is always considered
definitive, not merely one opinion that the government must take into
consideration." Id. at 603.
For years ... the Conseil's was the single most important voice in deciding
which precedents, laws, and principles were paramount in adjudicating this
complex and delicate matter .... As the highest legal institution with
jurisdiction over the actions of the French state, the Conseil d'ttat wielded
obvious power-and, at least as importantly, credibility-in shaping the
government's position toward Muslim apparel in public schools.
Id. at 609.
110 Id. at 584 (internal quotation marks omitted).
111 Id. at 619 (citing Conseil d'Etat, Mar. 10, 1995, Lebon at 123). "The decision
also mentions that the father of the two girls in question had participated in a
demonstration outside the school .... [which the Conseil] says aggravated the girls'
original offense in refusing to remove their scarves." Id. at 619 n.252.
112 Id. at 619. "The Conseil d'Etat has also invoked Article 9 in a decision
upholding the ruling that a woman cannot wear a headscarf in her photograph for
official identification because in such an instance the interest in public order
outweighs the interest in religious freedom." Id. at 621.
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kippas. Discrete signs are not included, for example medals,
small crosses, stars of David, hands of Fatimah, or a small
Koran. 113
Following the recommendation, in September 2004, France
enacted a law banning the display of "conspicuous" religious
symbols from the classrooms of all French public schools. 114
Although the ban formally covers every religious group, it is
generally perceived that the real purpose of the legislation is to
prevent Muslim schoolgirls from wearing the Islamic veil or
hijab115 in the classroom. France, which has one of Western
Europe's largest Muslim populations, 11 6  argues that the
prohibition is consistent with France's commitment to secularism
and neutrality in the public sphere.11 7 Herve Mariton, a deputy
in Parliament from Chirac's party, explains: "This neutrality
equals a kind of politeness. Politeness in the public sphere
means you do what is necessary to make others who are different
feel at ease."'18
Although the French law on religious dress and symbols had
strong public support and passed by an overwhelming majority in
the French Parliament,11 9  "[u]ntil recently, press reports
113 COMMISSION DE REFLEXION SUR L'APPLICATION DU PRINCIPE DE LAICITE
DANS LA REPUBLIQUE, RAPPORT AU PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE 58-59 (2003),
available at http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/034000725/0000.pdf
(internal quotation marks omitted), translated in Kristen Walder, France: Human
Rights, Religious Freedoms & a Secular Society?, 12 BUFF. WOMEN'S L.J. 11 (2004).
114 Law No. 2004-228 of Mar. 15, 2004, Journal Officiel de la Republique
Francaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Mar. 17, 2004, at 5190. The law states,
"In public schools, the wearing of symbols or clothing by which students
conspicuously... manifest a religious appearance is forbidden." Beller, supra note
109, at 581.
115 Though there are important differences between them, the terms headscarf,
veil, and hijab are used interchangeably throughout this article.
116 Steven G. Gey, Free Will, Religious Liberty, and a Partial Defense of the
French Approach to Religious Expression in Public Schools, Address at the Ninth
Annual Frankel Lecture, in 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 14 n.46 (referencing Milton Viorst,
The Muslims of France, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 78, which states that the
exact population figure is unknown because the French government has interpreted
its secularist constitutional mandate as prohibiting the government from inquiring
about the religious affiliation of its citizens); see also Walder, supra note 113 at 12.
117 See Beller, supra note 109, at 582; see also Gunn, supra note 71, at 462-63.
118 Tom Hundley, France in Hot Debate over Muslim Scarves, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 4,
2003 at 29.
119 See Keith B. Richburg, French Senate Approves Ban on Religious Attire,
WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2004, at A14. The lower chamber of French Parliament
approved the ban by a margin of 494 to 36. Elaine Sciolino, French Assembly Votes
To Ban Religious Symbols in Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2004, at A3. The French
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suggested that French school authorities were unwilling to
impose the new law too rigidly."120 One teenage Muslim girl's act
of cutting off all of her hair in protest of the ban attracted
international headlines, 121 and "members of France's Sikh
community also joined Muslims in calling for repeal of the
controversial law. 122
In Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court declared a
Baden-Wurttemberg administrative prohibition on teachers
wearing headscarves in public state schools 23 insufficient 24
because it was ambiguous and required elected legislatures to
create a "sufficiently clear legal basis" 125 for prohibiting the
ban. 26 The Court never addressed the issue of whether or not
the prohibition was valid, but instead ordered local legislatures
to re-write the laws. However, the Court failed to provide the
state legislatures with guidance on how to conform. As a result,
"laws in ... Germany's sixteen federal states [Bundesldnder or
Ldnder] must be amended if a particular state's law does not
declare directly that the state . . . prefers not to legislate on
whether a Muslim teacher may or may not wear a headscarf
while teaching. .".."127 In response, three states submitted draft
laws to provide a legal basis for prohibiting teachers from
wearing headscarves while teaching.128 "The potential for
conflict therefore remains considerable, and once an opponent of
the ban has exhausted all domestic remedies..., she is free to
Senate reaffirmed the ban by a majority vote of 276 to 20. French President Jacques
Chirac also announced his support for such a law. Richburg, supra.
120 Cumper, supra note 72, at 106.
121 Id.; see also Press Release, Assembly for the Protection of Hijab, ProHijab
Supports Cennet Doganay (Mar. 10, 2004), http://www.prohijab.net/english/press-
release-cennet-doganay.htm.
122 Cumper, supra note 72, at 106; see also Tom Heneghan, French Sikhs Upset
as Schools Bar Hair Coverings, REUTERS NEWS, Sept. 7, 2004, available at
http://in.news.yahoo.com/040907/137/2fxt5.html.
123 See Kopftuch-Urteil [Headscarf Decision] (Sept. 24, 2003), BVerfGE 108, 282,
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], NJW 56 (2003),
3111, 2 BvR 1436/02 (F.R.G.).
124 Axel Frhr. von Campenhausen, The German Headscarf Debate, 2004 BYU L.
REV. 665, 666 (2004).
125 Id.
126 See Headscarf Decision, supra note 123.
127 von Campensausen, supra note 124, at 667.
128 See id.
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submit her complaint to the European Court of Human
Rights."129
The European Court of Human Rights first addressed the
issue of whether a ban on religious garb was a violation of
Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights in the
Swiss case of Dahlab v. Switzerland.130 In that case, the ECHR
upheld a ban on religious garb worn by teachers. The ECHR
held that "the head scarf produced a proselytizing effect, and
wearing it appeared to be a requirement imposed upon women by
a precept of the Koran difficult to reconcile with the principle of
gender equality." 131 The Chamber stressed that the headscarf
was a "powerful external symbol" and held that "a democratic
State should be allowed to limit the right to wear the Islamic
head scarf if it found wearing it was incompatible with the
protection of rights and freedoms of others, public order and
public safety."132
In Leyla .,ahin v. Turkey,133 the ECHR squarely addressed
the issue of whether the state could ban the wearing of the hijab
by university students. Because of the importance of the issue,
the case was referred to the Grand Chamber, which affirmed the
judgment in November 2005.134 In its discussion, the Court
granted the state a wide margin of appreciation and upheld the
ban as consistent with the principles of secularism and
equality. 135  The petitioner, a medical student at Istanbul
University, challenged a restriction on wearing the Islamic
129 See Cumper, supra note 72, at 106 (discussing ban on headscarves in
France). The issue of banning headscarves also surfaced in Italy. See Ian Fisher,
Italian Woman's Veil Stirs More than Fashion Feud, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2004, at
A3.
130 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 447, 451 (2001) (reviewing prohibition barring a
primary school teacher in Geneva from wearing an Islamic headscarf).
131 J6natas E. M. Machado, Freedom of Religion: A View from Europe, 10 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 451, 488-89 (2005).
132 Id. at 488.
133 44774 Eur. Ct. H.R. 98, 114 (2005) available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/
tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=l132746FF1FE2A468ACCBCD1763D4D
8149&key=17671&sessionId=5786516&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true. The same
day as the $ahin decision, the Court decided unanimously to strike the companion
case of Zeynep Tekin v. Turkey, 41556 Eur. Ct. H.R. 98 (2004), which also alleged
violations of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights by a second-
year nursing student at the University of Ege for wearing the Islamic headscarf
instead of the regulation headwear required by the Higher-Education Authority.
134 The Grand Chamber consists of a seventeen-judge panel.
135 See $ahin, 44774 Eur. Ct. H.R. 98, at 114, 116, 122.
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headscarf in higher education institutions on the grounds that it
violated rights and freedoms guaranteed under the European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The
petitioner did not claim a right for "all women to wear the
Islamic headscarf in all places," 13 6 but rather that University
students were "discerning adults who enjoyed full legal capacity
and were capable of deciding for themselves what was
appropriate conduct." 137 This choice, she argued, was based on
religious conviction and that she had not sought to influence
fellow students or to undermine their rights and freedoms.1 38
The petitioner also argued that the ban violated her right to an
education, but this argument was rejected by the Court.1 39
Turkey, on the other hand, argued that the ban was based on
the two principles of secularism and gender equality.140
The Court focused on the issues raised under Article 9 of the
Convention which provides:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or
belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in
worship, teaching, practice and observance.
(2) Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public
safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 141
The Court noted that wearing the Islamic headscarf is a
relatively recent phenomena in Turkey that began in the 1980s
and was a subject of much debate in that country that has both
political and religious significance. Those favoring the headscarf
view it as a duty or form of expression linked to religious
identity. Those favoring the ban regard the "headscarf as a
symbol of a political Islam" that threatens civil order, seeks to
136 Id. at 9 1, 3, 15, 73.
137 Id. at 101.
138 Id. at 101.
139 Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention guarantees the right to an
education. See id. at 152.
140 Id. 112.
141 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Apr. 11, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, art. 9, available at http://conventions.
coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/HtmlI005.htm.
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establish a religious regime, and undermines rights acquired by
women under the Republican system. 142
The Court surveyed the law in several European states and
noted that national legal systems had reached different results
with respect to the ban on headscarves. 143 For example, a ban on
headscarves was upheld by the courts in Belgium on the grounds
that principles of equality and neutrality of state education take
precedence over freedom of religion.144 The Court also took note
of the French law of 2004 that prohibits the headscarf in state
primary and secondary schools, 145 referred to the legal debate in
Germany concerning the headscarf, 146 and noted that in the
United Kingdom, the Islamic headscarf is generally accepted.147
Turning to the situation in Turkey, the Court noted that the
Turkish Republic was founded on the principle that the state
should be secular (la~cit6). An important feature of the
Republican system was the status accorded to women's rights;
women were granted equality in the enjoyment of individual
rights in the Constitution of Turkey. 148
142 $ahin, 44774 Eur. Ct. H.R. 98, at 35. The Court has been criticized because
it ignored the fact that in Turkey, the ban was imposed at the instigation of the
military rather than by the democratically-elected government. See T. Jeremy Gunn,
Fearful Symbols: The Islamic Headscarf and the European Court of Human Rights
28 (July 4, 2005) (conference paper, on file with The Strasbourg Conference),
http://www.strasbourgconference.org/papers/Sahin%20by%2OGunn%2021%20by%20
T.%20Jeremy%2OGunn.pdf.
143 $ahin, 44774 Eur. Ct. H.R. 98, 55-69. For example, the Court compared
the prohibition against "the wearing of signs or dress by which pupils [in State
primary and secondary schools] overtly manifest a religious affiliation" in France
with cases in Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and
the United Kingdom where "State education authorities permit Muslim pupils and
students to wear the Islamic headscarf." Id. 9 56, 58 (emphasis added).
144 Id. 1 57. "Pupils are in principle allowed to wear religious signs. However,
they may do so only if human rights, the reputation of others, national security,
public order, and public health and morals are protected .... Id.
145 Id. 56.
146 Id. 59 ("[W]here the debate focused on whether teachers should be allowed
to wear the Islamic headscarf, the Constitutional Court stated ... that the lack of
any express statutory prohibition meant that teachers were entitled to wear the
headscarf.").
147 Id. 61 ("In the United Kingdom a tolerant attitude is shown to pupils who
wear religious signs. Difficulties with respect to the Islamic headscarf are rare.").
But see R (Shabina Begum) v. Head Teacher and Governors of Denbigh High School
[2004] EWCA (Civ) 199, [2005] 1 W.L.R. 3372 (Eng.) (holding that a fifteen-year-old
Muslim girl was permitted to wear a hijab to school, but could not wear a jilbab, a
long flowing garment, that was in contravention of the British school's uniform
policy).
148 5ahin, 44774 Eur. Ct. H.R. 98, 99 30-32.
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The Court proceeded on the assumption that the restriction
constituted an interference with a right to manifest one's religion
and that it was prescribed by law. However, it found that the
aim of the measures was legitimate, namely protecting the rights
and freedoms of others and protecting public order. 149 It then
considered whether the restriction was necessary in a democratic
society.
The petitioner argued not only that the headscarf did not
threaten public order, but also that the dress restriction was
applied in a discriminatory manner in that Jewish students were
permitted to wear a skull cap and Christian students to wear
crucifixes. 150 The government, on the other hand, stressed that
protection of the secular state was essential. It argued "that the
Islamic headscarf had become a sign that was regularly
appropriated by religious fundamentalist movements for political
ends and constituted a threat to the rights of women."'15' The
government also pointed out that Istanbul University had been
the scene of violent confrontations between opposing radical
groups and that authorities "sought to preserve the institution's
neutrality" by banning the wearing of religious signs. 152
In analyzing this issue, the Court noted that in areas
involving Church-state relations the margin of appreciation left
to the states is particularly important.' 53  With respect to
restricting the wearing of religious symbols, the rules vary widely
from state to state and there is no uniform conception of the
protection of "the rights and freedoms of others" and of "public
order." 54 The Court observed that the interference was based on
two principles: secularism and equality. The Constitutional
Court of Turkey had previously stated that secularism in Turkey
was the guarantor of democratic values, including religious
freedom and equality, and in particular gender equality.' 55
149 Id. 84-99.
150 Leyla $ahin v. Turkey, 44774/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. 299, 88 (29 June 2004)
(Chamber Judgment).
151 Id. 93.
152 Id. 96.
153 Id. 109-10.
154 Id. 109.
155 Id. 109-11. But see Lerner, supra note 59, at 85. Professor Natan Lerner
is critical of the lack of European supervision with respect to its application of the
margin of appreciation.
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The Court agreed with the Constitutional Court of Turkey in
its assessment that wearing the headscarf, in the Turkish
context, could be viewed as a compulsory religious duty and could
have a negative impact on those who choose not to wear it.156
Thus, the restriction met a pressing social need and furthered
the legitimate aims of "protection of rights and freedoms of
others" and "maintenance of public order."
The Court concluded that the principle of secularism was the
primary motivator of the dress ban. 157 Turkey was therefore
permitted to conclude that to permit the headscarf would run
counter to values of pluralism, respect for rights of others, and, in
particular, equality before the law of men and women.
Judge Frangoise Tulkens of Belgium, the sole dissenter,
while agreeing that secularism and equality were fundamental
principles, disagreed with the abstract and general context in
which the principles were evaluated by the Court. She argued
that the issue of whether the interference was necessary in a
democratic society must be evaluated in concreto.158
Judge Tulkens further noted that the petitioner did not
challenge the principle of secularism nor did her acts, conduct, or
attitude contravene that principle. She noted that the ban was
upheld because of threats posed by "extremist political
movements."1 59 It is vital, she said, "to distinguish between those
who wear the headscarf and 'extremists' who seek to impose the
headscarf as they do other religious symbols."'160 Further, she
questioned the connection between promoting equality and
banning the headscarf. Noting that the debate about the
156 $ahin, 44774 Eur. Ct. H.R. 98, 115.
157 Id. 116.
158 Id. 2 (Tulkens, J., dissenting). Judge Tulkens argued that the Court's
review must be evaluated:
by reference to three criteria: first, whether the interference ... was
appropriate; second, whether the measure that has been chosen is the
measure that is the least restrictive of the right or freedom concerned; and,
lastly, whether the measure was proportionate ... entail[ing] a balancing
of the competing interests.
Id.
159 Id. 10.
160 Id. Furthermore, Judge Tulkens drew a distinction between university
students and school pupils, opining that the former "might reasonably be expected to
have a heightened capacity to resist pressure[.]" Id.
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headscarf did not take into account the opinions of women, she
characterized the Court's assessment as "paternalism. '161
Judge Tulkens was particularly critical of the wide margin of
appreciation accorded to the States because of the diversity of
practice in Europe. 162 She noted that in "none of the member
States has the ban on wearing religious symbols extended to
university education" because those individuals are "less
amenable to pressure."1 63  She argued that a certain level of
European supervision seemed to be completely absent from the
judgment and was necessary since the right to freedom of
religion is, and should be, an issue of importance to all the
member States, and not merely a "local" issue. 16 4
The European Court of Human Rights is effectively the court
of last appeal and the verdict will have a major impact since
more than 1,000 women from Turkey have filed similar
applications. 165 The decision was roundly denounced by human
rights groups as a clear infringement on the right to religious
practice and expression. "The European Court has let down
thousands of women who will be prevented from studying in
Turkey's universities."'' 66
One noted scholar of religious liberty has argued that the
decision of the ECHR denies women the right of free choices and
notes "[t]he European Court of Human Rights should be adopting
principled decisions permitting manifestations of freedom of
conscience and belief-and not adopting the same choice-
suppressing measures favored by the dreaded
fundamentalists."167
161 Id. 12. Judge Tulkens "fail[ed] to see how the principle of sexual equality
[could] justify prohibiting a woman from following a practice which, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, she must be taken to have freely adopted." Id.
162 Id. 3 (asserting that there is a "lack of a European consensus" regarding
regulations on the "wearing of religious symbols in educational institutions").
163 Id.
164 Id. Judge Tulkens concluded that "European supervision [could not],
therefore, be escaped simply by invoking the margin of appreciation." Id.
165 Court Backs Turkish Headscarf Ban, BBC NEWS, Nov. 10, 2005, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4424776.stm.
166 Human Rights Watch, Turkey: Headscarf Ruling Denies Women Education
and Career, HUM. RTS. NEWS, (Nov. 16, 2005), http:/Ihrw.org/english/docs/2005/11/
16/turkey12038.htm.
167 Gunn, supra note 142, at 29; see also Benjamin D. Bleiberg, Unveiling the
Real Issue: Evaluating the European Court of Human Rights' Decision to Enforce the
Turkish Headscarf Ban in Leyla $ahin v. Turkey, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 162
(2005). "The most obvious effect of the ECHR's ruling is to effectively preclude an
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In the United States, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit upheld the banning of religious garb worn by public
school teachers in the classroom in United States v. Board of
Education for the School District of Philadelphia.168 The Court
rejected the argument that the ban constituted invidious
discrimination and held that the garb statute advanced a
compelling interest in maintaining the appearance of religious
neutrality in the public school classroom. 16 9 However, it is clear
that a ban imposed on graduate students as opposed to teachers
would be set aside. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who has been
most influential in charting the appropriate balance between
church and state, has articulated a centrist approach of
"preserving religious liberty to the fullest extent possible in a
pluralistic society."'170
1. An International Tribunal and the European Tradition of
Subsidiarity
The European Court of Human Rights is effectively the court
of last resort for claims of infringements of religion arising under
the European Convention. As Fr. Drinan points out and as the
above discussion illustrates, the ECHR has been extremely
deferential to state justification for infringement of free exercise
claims and has been roundly criticized for its embrace of
secularism. 171 One wonders, however, whether an international
tribunal could be more effective in resolving such issues. The
activities of the recently established international criminal
entire class of women from pursuing higher education in Turkey. Although the
ECHR may have intended to protect women, the court did not adequately anticipate
the repercussions of its actions." Id.
168 United States v. Bd. of Educ. for Sch. Dist. of Phila., 911 F.2d 882, 894 (3d
Cir. 1990).
169 Id. at 884, 893. In March 2004, the U.S. government filed a complaint on
behalf of a Muslim girl who was twice sent home from school for wearing a
headscarf. Assistant Attorney General Alexander Acosta said in a statement, "[w]e
certainly respect local school systems' authority to set dress standards, and
otherwise regulate their students, but such rules cannot come at the cost of
constitutional liberties .... Religious discrimination has no place in American
schools." US Opposes Oklahoma Headscarf Ban, BBC NEWS, Mar. 31, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2[hi/americas/3585377.stm.
170 McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2746 (2005) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
171 See DRINAN, supra note 1, at 90-92.
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tribunals give little reason for optimism and the effectiveness of
such tribunals has been called into question. 172
The Special Criminal Tribunal established for Rwanda was
imposed by a Security Council Resolution and required
compliance by all United Nations Member States. 73 Yet in
Yugoslavia, the most sought after and notorious war criminals
remain at large and appear to be supported by the state
apparatus. 174 In Rwanda, while a few of the most highly-placed
criminals have been brought to justice, the vast majority will be
tried through local traditional courts set up to handle the
accused. 175 It is these courts that have the most support from
172 Compare Ivana Nizich, International Tribunals and Their Ability To Provide
Adequate Justice: Lessons from the Yugoslav Tribunal, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP L.
353, 356 (2001) ("[Allmost all informed, objective observers of the Balkans in the
past decade are befuddled as to why the ICTY has not prosecuted crimes committed
in obviously abusive areas but has often focused on less-significant sites and
persons, and why has it taken so long to indict those that have been indicted.") and
Ken Roth, It's Worth Bringing Tyrants to Justice, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Aug. 10,
2005, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/08/09/opinion/edroth.php
("Critics argue that the threat of prosecution compels dictators to cling to power
rather than step down.") with Edith M. Lederer, Security Council Told To Stop
Complaining About High Cost of War Crimes Tribunals, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 7,
2004, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/general/2004/1007cost.htm
(quoting Prince Zeid Al Hussein: 'With an international community prepared to
spend almost one trillion U.S. dollars a year on weapons that historic companion of
war how can we say that anything we have spent thus far on justice, the surest
companion of peace, is too expensive?") and Andrew A. Jacovides, International
Tribunals: Do They Really Work for Small States?, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 253,
261 (2001).
I have no hesitation in maintaining the position that the proliferation of
international tribunals ought to and can be to the benefit of small states,
and that in solving a dispute through third-party settlement, a small state
is at much less of a disadvantage in relation to a large and powerful state
in a court of law or an arbitral tribunal than in any other manner of
dispute resolution.... [a]nd, to quote .... Secretary-General Kofi Annan's
statement of September 28, 2000, "the language of global society is
international law."
Id.
173 SCOR 955 (1994), available at http://65.18.216.88/ENGLISH/basicdocs/
statute/2004.pdf.
174 See generally Human Rights Watch, Balkans: Srebrenica's Most Wanted
Remain Free, HUM. RTS. NEWS, June 29, 2005, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/06/
29/bosherl1228.htm (chronicling the various sightings and arrest attempts for both
Mr. Mladic and Mr. Karadic).
175 Q&A: Rwanda's Long Search for Justice, BBC NEWS, Mar. 10, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.ud2/hi/africa/3246291.stm.
Traditional community courts, called gacaca, meaning the small lawn
where village elders congregate to solve disputes, have been introduced to
speed up the trial process. Suspects are taken to the villages where they
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Rwandan citizens. 176  Other nations have dealt with
accountability for international crimes through methods chosen
by their elected representatives. For example, in South Africa, a
Truth and Reconciliations Commission was effectively utilized to
deal with those charged with apartheid 177 despite appeals to the
Constitutional Court of South Africa that such a procedure
violated rights guaranteed in the South African Constitution.178
The judgments of the International Court of Justice have
often been ignored and the Court has been uneven in its efforts
and effectiveness. However, it is widely noted that the decisions
of the ECHR have been respected in each instance by the affected
Member States. 179
Central to the European system for the protection of human
rights is the principle of subsidiarity, which defines the
relationship between the Courts and the states parties. The
principle of subsidiarity as it applies to the European Convention
has been described by a senior officer with the European Court's
Registry in the following manner:
The object and purpose of the [European] Convention is to
achieve the 'collective enforcement'. . . of those fundamental
freedoms which are enshrined in the Convention .... [The]
allegedly committed their crimes and confronted directly by their
accusers.... The trials are not overseen by legally qualified judges but
local people respected for their integrity. Some called it 'mob justice' as
suspects will not have access to lawyers and will have to represent
themselves, but Human Rights Watch agreed that it was necessary despite
the legal shortcomings.
Id.
176 See John Hopkins University Center for Communications Programs, CCP."
Gacaca Program in Rwanda, http://www.jhuccp.org/africa/rwanda/gacaca.shtml#5
(last visited Mar. 17, 2006) (detailing the number of Rwandans that were either
informed or in agreement with the Gacaca election process). But see Robert Walker,
Rwanda Still Searching for Justice, BBC NEWS, Mar. 30, 2004, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/africa/3557753.stm. "'I think Gacaca does not ease tensions in the
beginning. It increases them. Who likes to be pointed out as a killer?' says Klaas de
Jonge, of Penal Reform International, who is coordinating a research project
assessing the effectiveness of the Gacaca courts." Id.
177 See Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 34 of 1995
(1995), available at http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/legislation/1995/act95-
034.html?rebookmark= 1.
178 See Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) & Ors v. President of the
Republic of South Africa & Ors [1996] ICHRL 53 (25 July 1996), available at
http://www.worldlii.org/int/cases/ICHRL/1996/53.html.
179 FRANCIS G. JACOBS & ROBIN C.A. WHITE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 407 (1996) ('The track record of compliance with decisions of the
Court ... has been impressive.").
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normative and procedural rules were in no way intended to take
the place of national human-rights provisions and machinery,
but were clearly designed to add a supplementary and ultimate
remedy to those safeguards which the internal law of the
Convention States afford to the individual.180
The European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms ("ECHRFF')'8 1 was drafted and adopted
shortly after the promulgation of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights ("UDHR").l8 2 When it became clear that the
binding agreements to implement the UDHR would not be
adopted for some time, the European nations drafted the
ECHRFF. However, as Fr. Drinan points out, the ECHR allows
each state a "margin of appreciation" in interpreting the
provisions of the Convention. 8 3  The doctrine of margin of
appreciation, or deference to national legislators, is rooted in
national case law concerning judicial review of legislative
action. 84 The margin of appreciation doctrine is premised on two
assumptions. First, even in democratic societies, what is
necessary to further a state's interest may vary from state to
state;' 8 5 second, the states' own view of what is necessary is
180 LOUiS HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 552 (citing Herbert Petzold, The
Convention and the Principle of Subsidiarity, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 41, 43 (R. St. J. McDonald et al. eds., 1993)).
181 The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
("ECHRFF') was signed on November 4, 1950 and entered into force on
September 3, 1953. Further, it "was composed of representatives of the European
Union governments, the European Parliament, national Parliaments, the European
Commission, and observers from the European Court of Justice and the Council of
Europe. It was a wise decision to include such observers as it ensured the
constructive collaboration both of the European Court of Justice and of the European
Court of Human Rights." Hans Christian Kriiger, The European Union Charter of
Fundamental Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights: An Overview,
in THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (Steve Peers and Angela Ward eds.,
2004).
182 JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
ORIGINS, DRAFTING, AND INTENT 12 (1999) ("[The] Third General Assembly adopted
the Declaration at just about midnight on December 10, 1948, with a vote of 48 to 0
and 8 abstentions.").
183 DRINAN, supra note 1, at 90.
184 See generally Jeffrey A. Brauch, The Margin of Appreciation and the
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law, 11
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 113, 115-17 (2005).
15 See, e.g., Leyla $ahin v. Turkey [GC], 44774 Eur. Ct. H.R. 98, 114 (Nov. 10,
2005), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&
table= 1132746FF1FE2A468ACCBCD 1763D4D8149&key= 17671&sessionId=578651
6&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true.
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entitled to some deference by an international court. 8 6  In
Handyside v. United Kingdom,8 7 the Court discussed the margin
of appreciation doctrine as follows:
[I]t is not possible to find in the domestic law of the various
Contracting States a uniform European conception of morals.
The view taken by their respective laws of the requirements of
morals varies from time to time and from place to place,
especially in our era which is characterised by a rapid and far-
reaching evolution of opinion on the subject. By reason of their
direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their
countries, State authorities are in principle in a better position
than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact
content of these requirements as well as on the "necessity" of a
"restriction" or "penalty" intended to meet them ....
Nevertheless, it is for the national authorities to make the
initial assessment of the reality of the pressing social need
implied by the notion of "necessity" in this context. 8 8
In cases concerning the relationship between the church and
state the Court has said:
Where questions concerning the relationship between State
and religions are at stake, on which opinion in a democratic
society may reasonably differ widely, the role of the national
decision-making body must be given special importance. This
will notably be the case when it comes to regulating the wearing
of religious symbols in educational institutions, especially in
view of the diversity of the approaches taken by national
authorities on the issue. It is not possible to discern throughout
Europe a uniform conception of the significance of religion in
society and the meaning or impact of the public expression of a
religious belief will differ according to time and context. Rules
in this sphere will consequently vary from one country to
[T]he Court considers this notion of secularism to be consistent with the
values underpinning the Convention. It finds that upholding that principle,
which is undoubtedly one of the fundamental principles of the Turkish
State which are in harmony with the rule of law and respect for human
rights, may be considered necessary to protect the democratic system in
Turkey. An attitude which fails to respect that principle will not
necessarily be accepted as being covered by the freedom to manifest one's
religion and will not enjoy the protection of Article 9 of the Convention[.]
Id.
186 See id. 109.
187 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////
tkpl97/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=l132746FF1FE2A468ACCBCD1763D4D
8149&key=12039&sessionId=6076873&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true.
188 Handyside, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 48.
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another according to national traditions and the requirements
imposed by the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others
and to maintain public order. Accordingly, the choice of the
extent and form such regulations should take must inevitably
be left up to a point to the State concerned, as it will depend on
the domestic context concerned.
[T]his margin of appreciation goes hand in hand with a
European supervision embracing both the law and the decisions
applying it. The Court's task is to determine whether the
measures taken at national level were justified in principle and
proportionate. 189
Clearly the most effective fora are those established with the
support of people most closely affected. Building upon these
experiences, the newly established International Criminal Court
("ICC") incorporates the principle of complementarity, which
provides that the ICC shall have jurisdiction only when national
courts are unable or unwilling to prosecute.190
Moreover, just as the principle of subsidiarity favors national
courts in Europe over submission to the ECHR, the principle
would also militate against referral of religious claims to an
international forum rather than a local or regional forum.
The Catholic Church originally espoused the principle of
subsidiarity through the teachings of Pope Pius XI. In his 1931
Encyclical, Quadragesimo Anno, the Pope said that:
It is a fundamental principle of social philosophy, fixed and
unchangeable, that one should not withdraw from individuals
and commit to the community what they can accomplish by
their own enterprise and industry. So, too, it is an injustice and
at the same time a grave evil and a disturbance of right order,
to transfer to the larger and higher collectivity functions which
can be performed and provided by lesser and subordinate
bodies. Inasmuch as every social activity should, by its very
nature, prove a help to member of the body social, it should
never destroy or absorb them.191
It is the duty of the government to care for the common
welfare of its constituents. While the principle of subsidiarity
189 $ahin, 44774 Eur. Ct. H.R. 98, 109-110 (citations omitted).
190 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 17(1) (a)-(b), July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm.
191 Pope Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno, [An Encyclical Letter on Reconstruction
of Social Order], 79 (May 15, 1931), reprinted in 3 THE PAPAL ENCYCLICALS 1903-
1939, at 428 (Claudia Carlen Ihm ed., 1990).
20061
108 JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 45:73
was originally formulated in the economic context, subsidiarity
has been applied to advocating political change,1 92 health care
reform, 193  social communication, 194  humanism,1 95  fighting
crime, 196  organization of corporate culture, 197  global civil
society, 198  transnational authorities,199  globalization, 200
agriculture, 20 1 education, 20 2 public policy, 20 3 balanced markets, 20 4
192 See Richard R. Gaillardetz, The Ecclesiological Foundations of Modern
Catholic Social Teaching, in MODERN CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING: COMMENTARIES
& INTERPRETATIONS 72, 84-85 (Kenneth R. Himes, O.F.M. ed., 2005) (citing and
quoting Pope Paul VI, Octogesima adveniens) ("It is up to these Christian
communities... to discern the options and commitments which are called for in
order to bring about the social, political, and economic changes seen in many cases to
be urgently needed."); see also Kenneth R. Himes, The Local Church as a Mediating
Structure, in 12 SOC. THOUGHT 23, 25-26 (1985).
193 See Fr. Place, Health Care: Essential Building Block of a Free Society, in 29
ORIGINS CNS DOCUMENTARY SERVICE 49, 52 (1999).
194 Pontifical Council for Social Communications, Ethics in Communications, 30
ORIGINS CNS DOCUMENTARY SERVICE 49, 54 (2000) ("Principles of social ethics like
solidarity, subsidiarity, justice and equity, and accountability in the use of public
resources and the performance of roles of public trust are always applicable.").
195 See Bishop Loverde, Advocates of the "New Humanism," in 30 ORIGINS CNS
DOCUMENTARY SERVICE, 286, 287 (2000) (quoting John Paul II, Address to
University Professors (2000)) ("The humanism which we desire advocates a vision of
society centered on the human person and his inalienable rights, on the values of
justice and peace, on a correct relationship between individuals, society and the
state, on the logic of solidarity and subsidiarity.").
196 U.S. Bishops, Responsibility, Rehabilitation and Restoration: A Catholic
Perspective on Crime and Criminal Justice, in 30 ORIGINS CNS DOCUMENTARY
SERVICE, 389, 396 (2000).
[Subsidiarity] encourages communities to be more involved. Criminal
activity is largely a local issue and, to the extent possible, should have local
solutions. Neighborhood-watch groups, community-oriented policing, ....
neighborhood treatment centers and local support for ex-offenders all can
be part of confronting crime and fear of crime in local communities.
Id.
197 See Fr. William Byron, Trust and Integrity in Organizations, in 34 ORIGINS
CNS DOCUMENTARY SERVICE 118, 120 (2004).
198 Fr. John Coleman, Globalization's Challenge, in 34 ORIGINS CNS
DOCUMENTARY SERVICE 322, 326 (2004) ("Catholic voices endorse a notion of global
civil society and embrace the concept of subsidiarity in any global governance
regime.").
199 Drew Christiansen, S.J., Commentary on Pacem in terris (Peace on Earth),
in MODERN CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING: COMMENTARIES & INTERPRETATIONS 217,
240 n.51 (Kenneth R. Himes, O.F.M. ed. (2005) ("[W]hile the idea of a universal or
transnational political authority is an expression of the Catholic belief in the one
human family and by virtue of historical conditions an increasingly necessary ideal,
it is an ideal conditioned and limited by the principle of subsidiarity.").
200 See John Paul II, Pastores Gregis, 33 ORIGINS CNS DOCUMENTARY SERVICE
353, 387 (2003).
201 U.S. Bishops, For I Was Hungry and You Gave Me Food: Catholic Reflections
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international debts, 20 5 responsible citizenship, 20 6 the church
itself,20 7 citizen participation in the energy crises of the early
1980s, 208 production in the economy, 209 and world political
on Food, Farmers, and Farmworkers, in 33 ORIGINS CNS DOCUMENTARY SERVICE
510, 515 (2004) ("In the case of agriculture, solidarity and subsidiarity lead us to
support and promote smaller, family-run farms not only to produce food but also to
provide a livelihood for families and to form the foundation of rural communities.").
202 Pontifical Council for the Family, The Truth and Meaning of Human
Sexuality, in 25 ORIGINS CNS DOCUMENTARY SERVICE 529, 535 (1996 ) ("[T]he
mission of education must always be carried out in accordance with ... the principle
of subsidiarity."); see also Bishops of Colorado, The Christian Coalition's Catholic
Alliance, in 25 ORIGINS CNS DOCUMENTARY SERVICE 574, 576 (1996) ("In keeping
with the principles of liberty and subsidiarity, the Catholic Alliance asserts that
parents have the right and responsibility to direct the education of their
children[.]").
203 See Theodore McCarrick, Religion in Foreign Affairs, in 26 ORIGINS CNS
DOCUMENTARY SERVICE 563, 564-65 (1997).
204 John Paul II, Toward a Balanced, Well-Regulated World Market, in 27
ORIGINS CNS DOCUMENTARY SERVICE 42, 43 (1997) ("[]t is essential that political
activity assure a balanced market in its classical form by applying the principles of
subsidiarity and solidarity, according to the model of the social state.").
205 See USCC Administrative Board, A Jubilee Call for Debt Forgiveness, in 28
ORIGINS CNS DOCUMENTARY SERVICE 793, 795 (1999).
206 See Administrative Board of the National Catholic Welfare Conference,
Statement on Social Problems 1 16 (Nov. 28, 1937), reprinted in 1 PASTORAL
LETTERS OF THE UNITED STATES CATHOLIC BISHOPS: 1792-1940, at 425 (Hugh J.
Nolan ed., 1984). "The tendency of our time is to make more and more demands on
government. Citizens and groups should not ask the government to do for them what
the can do for themselves. Sound social policy requires government to encourage
citizens to assume as much personal responsibility as possible." Id.
207 See Committee on Conciliation and Arbitration, Procedures Adopted by the
General Membership of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops 3 (Nov. 14,
1979), reprinted in 4 PASTORAL LETTERS OF THE UNITED STATES CATHOLIC BISHOPS
1975-1983, at 331 (Hugh J. Nolan ed., 1984) ("It shall be the secondary function of
the Bishops' Committee on Conciliation and Arbitration to be available as a resource
to assist, upon request, with the development and improvement of local-level
structures for the resolution of disputes.").
208 See Committee on Social Development and World Peace, United States
Catholic Conference, Reflections on the Energy Crisis 24 (Apr. 2, 1981), reprinted
in 4 PASTORAL LETTERS OF THE UNITED STATES CATHOLIC BISHOPS 1975-1983, at
444, 461 (Hugh J. Nolan, ed., 1984).
Generally speaking, the smaller the entity responsible for a particular
decision-individual rather than group, state rather than federal
government, local distributor rather than multinational corporation-the
better chance an informed citizenry has of affecting it.... [T]hose holding
authority in the public and private sectors should be constantly looking for
ways to center energy decision making as near the grass roots as possible.
While adopting this course might lessen efficiency, it should produce
results more satisfactory to the people and ultimately to the institutions
that serve them.
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order. 210 Quadragesimo Anno further states that lower levels of
society should address issues where they are capable of doing
so.
2 11
Pope John Paul II has stated that:
Many issues [can and ought] to be brought to fruitful
agreement on the continental or regional or other intermediate
level. The need for global solutions to many problems should
not blind us to the possibilities of resolving problems and
building a better future on adequate rather than all-
encompassing standards of living. In fact, applying the notion
209 John XXIII, Mater et Magistra, [Encyclical of Pope John XXIII on
Christianity and Social Progress], 117 (May 15, 1961), reprinted in 5 THE PAPAL
ENCYCLICALS 1958-1981, at 72 (Claudia Carlen Ihm, ed., 1990).
The State and other agencies of public law must not extend their ownership
[of private property] beyond what is clearly required by considerations of
the common good properly understood, and even then there must be
safeguards. Otherwise private property could be reduced beyond measure,
or, even worse, completely destroyed.
Id. This encyclical is also available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john xxiii
encyclicals/documents/hfj-xxiii enc15051961_materen.html (last visited Mar. 17,
2006).
210 John XXIII, Pacem in Terris, [Encyclical of Pope John XXIII on Establishing
Universal Peace in Truth, Justice, Charity, and Liberty], 140 (Apr. 11, 1963),
reprinted in 5 THE PAPAL ENCYCLICALS, supra note 209, at 122-23.
The same principle of subsidiarity which governs the relations between
public authorities and individuals, families and intermediate societies in a
single State, must also apply to the relations between the public authority
of the world community and the public authorities of each political
community. The special function of this universal authority must be to
evaluate and find a solution to economic, social, political and cultural
problems which affect the universal common good. These are problems
which, because of their extreme gravity, vastness and urgency, must be
considered too difficult for the rulers of individual States to solve with any
degree of success.
Id. This encyclical is also available at http://www.vatican.vaholy
_father/john xxiii/encyclicals/documents/hfj-xxiii enc1 1041963_pacemen.html
(last visited Mar. 17, 2006).
211 Pius XI, supra note 191, at 428.
The supreme authority of the State ought.., to let subordinate groups
handle matters and concerns of lesser importance, which would otherwise
dissipate its efforts greatly. Thereby the State will more freely, powerfully,
and effectively do all those things that belong to it alone because it alone
can do them: directing, watching, urging, restraining, as occasion requires
and necessity demands. Therefore, those in power should be sure that the
more perfectly a graduated order is kept among the various associations, in
observance of the principle of 'subsidiary function,' the stronger social
authority and effectiveness will be the happier and more prosperous the
condition of the State.
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of subsidiarity, we can see that there are many groups and
peoples who can solve their own problems better at a local or
intermediate level, and that such action moreover gives them a
direct sense of participation in their own destinies. This is a
positive advance and one to which we all should be sensitive.2 12
One theologian has posited that:
We now have reached a point in history where the principle of
subsidiarity with respect to the common good must be applied to
the states themselves in their relation to the global community.
In the present intensified exchange among nations, the
principle of subsidiarity may assist us in overcoming socially
dangerous and ethically unjustifiable political divisions. It can
also prevent the imposition of an international authority that
ignores the particular economic and cultural interests of
individual nations and contributes no more to the global
common good than a universally resented international police
corps.2 13
The principle of subsidiarity has been incorporated into the
jurisprudence of the European Union and now applies to
virtually all aspects of Union activities. Subsidiarity, as a
limitation on conferred Union power, was introduced into Union
Law in 1992 in the Maastricht Treaty, which stated that in areas
outside the EU's exclusive competence, it should take action
"only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can
therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action,
be better achieved by the Community."214  The subsidiarity
principle as articulated in the Maastricht Treaty was criticized
by several member states, especially Great Britain and
Denmark, because it was "too vague a principle to be relied upon
in law."2 15  However, in response to a Danish referendum
rejecting the Maastricht agreement, the European Council
212 John Paul II, Presentation to H.E. Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, President of the
General Assembly of the United Nations (Aug. 22, 1980), reprinted in PERMANENT
OBSERVER MISSION OF THE HOLY SEE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, PATHS TO PEACE: A
CONTRIBUTION 1418, at 221 (1987).
213 Louis Dupr6, The Common Good and the Open Society, in CATHOLICISM AND
LIBERALISM, at 192-193 (R. Bruce Douglass & David Hollenbach eds., 1994); see also
supra note 199.
214 Maastricht Treaty, art. 3b, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C191) 1, 31 I.L.M. 253
(1992), available at http://www.eurotreaties.commaastrichtec.pdf.
215 Euro-know.org, Subsidiarity, http://www.euro-know.org/dictionary/s.html#
Subsidiarity (last visited Mar. 17, 2006).
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created a set of guidelines to reinforce the subsidiarity principle,
including the requirement of an explanatory statement to the
Council that showed justification of the initiative in accordance
with subsidiarity. The draft constitution for the EU retains,
reinforces, and strengthens principles of subsidiarity,216 and
requires consultation with national parliaments before action is
taken at the national level. 2 17  However, it was primarily
dissatisfaction with the increasing directives from Brussels
ignoring subsidiarity and with the weakening of local initiatives
that led to the resounding rejection of the draft Constitution in
216 See EU Const. Treaty, supra note 26, art. I-11. "The limits of Union
competences are governed by the principle of conferral. The use of Union
competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality." Id.
Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its
exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and insofar as the
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the
Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can
rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better
achieved at Union level.
Id. art. 1-11-3.
The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies,
offices and agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of
subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing
Union law. They shall therefore respect the rights, observe the principles
and promote the application thereof in accordance with their respective
powers and respecting the limits of the powers of the Union as conferred on
it in the other Parts of the Constitution.
Id. art. II-111-1. "National Parliaments shall ensure that the proposals and
legislative initiatives submitted under Sections 4 and 5 of this Chapter comply with
the principle of subsidiarity, in accordance with the arrangements laid by the
Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.' Id.
art. 111-259.
217 See id. Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and
Proportionality, art. 5. "Draft European legislative acts shall be justified with regard
to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Any draft European legislative
act should contain a detailed statement making it possible to appraise compliance
with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality." Id.
Any national Parliament or any chamber of a national Parliament may,
within six weeks from the date of transmission of a draft European
legislative act, send to the Presidents of the European Parliament, the
Council and the Commission a reasoned opinion stating why it considers
that the draft in question does not comply with the principle of
subsidiarity.
Id. art. 6. "Where reasoned opinions on a draft European legislative act's non-
compliance with the principle of subsidiarity represent at least one third of all the
votes allocated to the national Parliaments . . . the draft must be reviewed." Id. art.
7. "The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction in actions on
grounds of infringement of the principle of subsidiarity by a European legislative
act ... " Id. art. 8.
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France and the Netherlands, despite the fact that the
Constitution itself was little understood by the peoples of
Europe.218
Religious freedom is at the apex of rights of the individual
and, at least in the European context, the principle of
subsidiarity would seem to prefer protection at the local or
regional level rather than an international forum.
CONCLUSION
Europe, whether old or new, is becoming increasingly
secular. While religious beliefs remain sacrosanct, religious
liberty, or the freedom to express religious beliefs, is devalued.
Although Europe has embraced three models of church-state
relations, these models do not necessarily correlate with the
protections afforded with religious liberty. The most secular
state, France, with its commitment to the ideology of laFcit , has
been most restrictive of religious liberty as opposed to religious
belief. Greece, with an established Church, has also been
criticized for its restrictions on religious liberty particularly with
respect to its ban on proselytizing. However, other countries,
such as Italy, with a system of cooperation, or the United
Kingdom, with an established Church, have been cited as
responsive to claims of infringement of religious liberty. The
European Court of Human Rights has affirmed that secularism is
a value that a state may advance even when acts prescribed by
law run counter to claims of religious liberty. However, the
expansive decision was rendered in the context of a state firmly
committed to a policy of secularism that was subjected to violent
confrontations. The Court might in the future refine or limit its
ruling to the particular political situation in Turkey that the
Court faced.
In Europe, the principle of subsidiarity first articulated in
papal encyclicals is entrenched both in European Union Law and
in the practice of the ECHR and its institutions. This principle
prefers local or regional fora for protection of rights rather than
international courts.
218 See Press Release, European Union Committee of the Regions, EU Should
Implement Democratic Safeguards in Stalled Constitution Now Without Waiting for
Ratification, Says CoR President (Nov. 17, 2005), available at http://europa.eu.int/
rapidpressReleasesAction.do?reference=CORO5/128&format=PDF&aged=l&langua
ge=EN&guiLanguage=en.
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In Europe, respect for human rights is protected at the
regional or national level with well-developed legal systems and
traditions. Despite criticisms of some of the decisions of the
ECHR, and while variations among the states exist, encompassed
within the margin of appreciation is a common shared value
which surfaces when infringements on human rights are alleged.
Thus, an international forum for claims of infringement of
religious liberty would run counter to deeply established
traditions in Europe.
